Category Archives: Trinity

The Gyromodel, and a letter to Dr Andrulis

 Hi Dr Andrulis

 I am trying to understand your paper (, and I am running into difficulty.
First, I like the idea of gyre. It is a lot like the holon idea introduced by Arthur Koestler. I like the idea of oscillation around a singularity, as the gyre reaches to high and low energy states. I understand the second law of thermodynamics to be two-sided, meaning that the equivocation of “reprensentation” and “recognition” is the only way to foolishly return to something one-sided; that is, yes the 2nd law hides a metphysical singularity. 
But I don`t understand Figures 1 and 2. In fact, its is unclear how the philosophy of the gyremodel relates to the biochemistry (which I am not an expert). Moreover, one may describe the philosophy more generally before trying to integrate the model back into the biochemistry. One is led to a possible conclusion that your paper is another spoof that follows the style of Alan Sokal. But I want to show your theory more grace than that, if only because Lovelock`s Giai theory is probably correct, as well as a neo-vitalism, and panpsychism, all of which may be agreeable with the gyremodel.
I have my own Trinitarian vitalism, or theory, that I would like to reconnect to a chemical hierarchy and pattern of emergence, even by starting with the elementary particles. Mapping out this emergence in detail would convince a lot of non-believers. I thought just maybe that you have done this?
See some of my papers:
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely, Stephen P. Smith, author of Trinity: the scientific basis of vitalism and transcendentalism

A letter to David Haury

Hi David,
Interesting article you have in:
When reflecting on the origin of truth, one discovers that this particular issue does not really belong to science. The topic is closer to philosophy, i.e., epistemology where Kant made his mark, but even this does not do the topic justice. According to intuitionist understanding, apparent truth springs from something more innate: a trust worthy awareness, of which knowing thy self becomes more fundamental. Or in other words, to win a trust that grounds us to broad reality, there must be a vetting process to puts our most tightly held beliefs to the test. Unfortunately, this vetting process is not traditional science, rather it is closer to a transcendental science as Edmund Husserl noted.
Putting the “scientific theory of evolution” to the test does NOT return Darwin`s theory of evolution, it returns something different as I explain in my paper:

Two-sided emotion and universal grammar

I wrote before about the two-sidedness of emotionality. This should not be surprising, sense emotionality relates to motivation, desire, action and intention. Because action and intention come to bear on the question of determinism and freewill, we see that emotion relates directly to Kant`s third antinomy that is found two-sided: i.e., it is just as easy to interpret emotion from the vantage point offered by liberation and self-determination, as it is to argue that emotion is the by-product of circumstance beyond our control.

This explains why traditional science can`t explain emotion, and why emotion can only be studied with a transcendental science. This explains why the unscrupulous libertine can interpret emotions one way, and act in a different way; that is, the libertine will equivocate his two interpretations of emotionality depending on what is most expedient.

I offer two definitions that may find relevance, assuming my intuition is pristine enough:

1. Prejudice: a premature articulation and judgment of what emotion that is found sense-certain.

2. Intolerance: a call to respect the two-sidedness of one`s own emotionality, while enforcing a one-sided interpretation of the emotionality coming from others.

Question: Assuming God`s plan is to avoid prejudice and intolerance, and noting that Kant`s third antinomy offers a doorway into Trinitarian philosophy where emotionality is found sourcing the middle-term that holds the sides of the antinomy together, then how might we arrive at the universal grammar that is now underwritten by the emotionality that is found transcendent?

When faced with emotion we may slow down, to give emotion enough time for its articulation and thoughtful action. Feeling may be treated by reflex action where we give ourselves over to subconscious control, which is fine. However, to avoid being a libertine we seek a pathway beyond prejudice, defined above, and this implies that enough time must pass to bring deliberation to a proper conclusion. Then we may act, noting that deliberation is followed by liberation. Note, however, to avoid intolerance there must also be a call to respect the two-sided emotionality that is found transcendent. So not just any conclusion will do, and more work may be noted.

Awareness finds itself with the articulation of the emotion that is found sense-certain. But note, this is as much the emotion returning to its transcendent source by liberation, and so awareness finds its self in its provisionality that is less than an absolute understanding. Therefore, this provisionality should open itself up to its own two-sidedness again, lest more unresolved tension remain for further rounds of articulation. The less aware, or the libertine, will fall short in these demands. Nevertheless, I believe the universality of this pattern remains, and hence we find the universal grammar.

Charging a false dichotomy to protect belief in natural selection

Re., evolution: Is the distinction between competition and cooperation a false dichotomy? Answer, No! A false dichotomy only relates to picking one side or the other. I am suggesting both sides, or the synthesis of competition and cooperation, and this is a Trinitarian extension. The false dichotomy is more related to the fallacy of excluded middle, but what I am saying is that: you can’t exclude the middle term.

But what exactly is it that is found oscillating between competition and cooperation? Certainly not the blind watchmaker because I have been reminded that this watchmaker is only metaphorical. So what is it? Answer, life! But note that life is not self-contained in mere word definitions that can exist out side of the universe. Part of life has to do with what is self evidently part of concrete reality, and less about abstract definitions. Is this the life that has fragmented itself into life forms that are found competing within the environment? Or is this the life that comes as the whole environment that supports the cooperation of life forms in community? I don`t think you can pin this on one side or the other (i.e., you need two sides), and this life is now well beyond what we think about with natural selection because this tendency to compete, or cooperate, implies both agency and intelligence. Life is found to be intelligent.

Here is an additional point: A life so noted with powers to strive, to compete or cooperate, can provide feedback on itself where it is conceivable to think about adaptive mutations that are no longer just accidental. This Lamarckian-type extension is less remarkable once we realize that striving to survive is also very remarkable (my prior point) because it impacts the space-time fabric beyond what is permitted by blind action represented in geometry. Striving is intelligent action, it is navigation. And once we have hypothetical mutations that can already be impacted by teleology (the additional point), we also have the issue of surviving genes that are selected for in the next generation (the prior point). With life striving this selection can no longer be claimed to be “natural” selection, independent of the origin of mutations. Nevertheless, I believe the possibility of adaptive mutations provide a reasonable theory that can find evidential support, and these mutations can`t be just “random.”

When one-sided cooperation fails

We hear the secularist calls for cooperation. We hear that women can have more to offer in the wake of Anthony Weiner`s failings. Men are said to be too competitive, and too much interested in their ego, too much as risk takers.

However, there is a problem with a one-sided call for cooperation. The call is merely for the sake of cooperation, and the worthiness of a cooperative system is taken for granted. For example, sometimes risk taking is needed, and a collective body can be indecisive when bold leadership is needed. We can only cooperate if we trust the system. An untrustworthy system will find only competition, even as it calls for cooperation and higher taxes to support more and more bloated government. Cooperation is no more a panacea than competition was, and so it is cooperation that must also be brought to its negation in the one-sided.

Is natural selection about competition, or cooperation? Darwin`s original formulation merged into “survival of the fittest.” This interpretation culminated in the eugenics movement, and unfortunate happenings in the first half of the twentieth century. But nowadays its is more fashionable to note the importance of the cooperation that is apparent in evolution. Nevertheless, there is a problem in pointing to an evolution driven by competition, or cooperation. Only an agent can compete, or cooperate, and a blind watchmaker is useless at both. There is no one-sided mapping of life`s impetus to survive on a natural selection that is thought to be otherwise indifferent. Both competition and cooperation fail to describe what is carried innately by life, because these words come with definitions that are not self-contained.

Hegel can come to the rescue, and provide a solution that is dialectical. Natural selection was first thought to be competitive enough for Darwin, as he accepted Herbert Spencer`s coinage of “survival of the fittest.” But this initial attempt to characterize evolution fails in what Hegel calls the first negation. The trick is to note that cooperation also fails to describe evolution, i.e., in a second negation. We need only observe that life fails to cooperate with other life that are found untrustworthy. Tame animals will rebel from domestication if good animal husbandry is not followed. These animals will go feral, and their offspring will be almost wild in one generation despite the years of selective breeding.

Cooperation will also meet the second negation. And therefore, Hegel noted that competition and cooperation must form a synthesis. This synthesis is no longer described by a natural selection that is thought indifferent, however. To compete, or cooperate, depends on the vital impetus, and this is now finding agreement with Hegel`s absolute Concept. The vital impetus is Spirit.

Cut-throat competition and profit motive fosters cooperation


Click Here

Article reads: “The study confirms that a shame tactic can be effective, but rather surprisingly, we’ve also found that apparently honour has an equally strong effect on encouraging people to cooperate for the common good,” says co-author Christoph Hauert, an assistant professor in UBC’s Dept. of Mathematics and an expert on game theory.

Shaming competitors in their defeat, and rewarding those that are cooperative with you, says nothing about the ideal of a cooperative society. But it is the same old carrot and stick approach that is common sense, not that your position is correct!

Likewise, an overbearing mother and a lenient father can foster rebellion from the collective called “carrot world” and this brings on competition and the use of more sticks. There is no escaping the trappings of life. Competition breeds cooperation, and cooperation returns to competition, and it stays that way till the horse is tamed.
The hatchling grows feathers, and takes its first flight. The young bird tries to return to the nest, but finds itself changed.
A question that is forgotten to ask: who, or what, does all this competition or cooperation? The first negation is to differentiate, and this carries competition. The second negation is to return to the unity, and this carries cooperation. The pure understanding only needs two negations to find itself and return to source, the rest of us may need to work a little longer to find the same pattern repeating before we get it right like the horse.

God as Adaptive Illusion


Click Here

Book review reads: Bering doubts we’ll ever be fully rid of God.  He thinks “nature has played too good a trick on us” (201).  He’s not even sure it would be a good thing, all things considered, to overcome the God illusion.  So what’s the payoff of Bering’s own work then?  He suggests that it enables us to “distance ourselves from an adaptive system that was designed, ultimately, to keep us hobbled in fear.”

This is a book written to dumb the people down, and hobble them with the dictates of scientism. These self-lovers can find no other conclusion, even as they describe a reality with the same indifference as the hammer.

A hammer is a simple invention, even power hammers that are machines like the toaster. But to describe life as a machine that emerges from natural selection is to forget that life`s machines actually do feel. So show me a toaster that can feel itself baking bread? Otherwise, I won`t be impressed with mere hammers that are controlled by an outside agency.

On Suffering: The Nazis were good at cooking things too, and like today`s toasters they felt no pain. If only they could feel themselves baking Jews, but they were as the mere hammer too and forgot to take charge of their own agency. Pain informs, as does all feeling and emotion. Pain is to be healed, and mindfulness to extend itself over a wider perspective. With no suffering there would be no error recognition, and no agency to aline oneself to. Noted pathology is the result of not taking ownership of what is dearest to us; the bread that the toaster should love to cook.

We fight and compete too much?


Click Here

Book review reads: Traits such as selfishness, greed, aggressiveness, competitiveness evolved and became fixed in our genetic soul, while traits such as prudence, sense of responsibility and wisdom were totally bypassed and selected against.

Too much competition, and not enough cooperation? Answer – hardly!

You cooperate if you trust the system, otherwise you must compete. And if you are lucky enough to control the system, then you may still need to earn the people`s trust where you find yourself competing again.

We might as well talk about trust and agency, and what is found ineffable. The choice-less hammer is faithfully under the control of agency, provided by the carpenter. Each must earn its own lever of trust to do its specialized level of work, like cells and organs of the body. However, I would not trust the carpenter to work outside of his field, say as a liver or as a dentist that works on my teeth. Likewise, I would not trust a scientist to pontificate on spirituality, without a wider focus and a life-time worth of experience. In particular, I would not trust a scientist that represents reality as something that shares the indifference offered by the hammer. Note the levels of provisionality, with divisions of labor that become stretched if labor reaches outside its domain of application. The study of evolution cannot escape this challenge of narrow focus, when a wider perspective is also needed to see beyond mere existentialism into a realm where there is enough difference to permit self-replication.

From the very small, to the widest perspective, the question of agency continues to escape our definitions until the trust is won. In the end, there need only be one agent that is trustworthy.

Is it competition, or is it cooperation?


Artricle reads: The traditional forces of evolution are mutation and selection. Let us consider a population of reproducing individuals. If reproduction occurs with mistakes, we have mutation. If mutants reproduce at different rates, we have selection. Mutation and selection are the classic components of the evolutionary process, and they explain a lot. But if we ask: How do we get complexity? How do we get the emergence of more and more complicated structures? Then I’m arguing you need a third component, and this is cooperation.

Neither competition, nor cooperation, contain the vital drive we all feel. It is only that competition and cooperation are necessary, as we engage reality and even oscillate between the two and enter into a dialectic. For example, one may focus on the fine details (to go our own way, to compete), and then surrender to the surrounding background (go with the flow, or cooperate). Likewise, one can use deductive thought to evaluate particular outcomes, and then to fall back on inductive thinking to generalize. This sets up an internal oscillation that will converge to a crisper expression. In dialectic form this may converge to an agreement among opposing positions. Otherwise, a bio-polar oscillation may not converge, and in this case may reveal a deeper disagreement.

Note that when we speak of competition, or cooperation, we are characterizing the vital drive that we all feel. It is not that this drive is explained by natural selection, it is that the vital drive comes as a necessary precondition. More generally, the apparent oscillation between (competition and cooperation) is needed to tune one`s self to God`s emotion, which is a transcendent love. The oscillation is like a prayer. It is not that this oscillation is sufficient, but it is necessary. It is not like the vital is an explained oscillation, but oscillation is a needed expression if God is going to answer our prayers.

Through the activity of competition and cooperation, we find what we are looking for and can move on to higher expressions. In evolution the vital finds a mutation that becomes useful for survival, like a rock climber that clings to pressure points on a rock surface and climbs higher with the discovery of new and better grips and supports. Some call this evolution natural selection, but it is the vital that does all the work.

Statistical errors and psychological tendencies in scientism

Statistical errors come in two varieties that relate to statistical hypothesis testing. We start our discussion with two hypotheses: denoted by Ho and Ha. Ho is called the null hypothesis, and Ha is called the alternative hypothesis. Ho is the more fundamental of the two, but only because the common probability measures and significance levels are calculated assuming Ho is true. For example, the Type I error is made when the rejection rule indicates that Ho is rejected when Ho is true. Therefore, the probability of a Type I error is calculated assuming Ho is true, and given the rejection rule. More generally, the rejection rule is fashioned to return the desired Type I error rate, and this fashioning can even become self-serving, as we will see.

Nevertheless, we could argue that Ho is not more fundamental than Ha, because in the real world the statistician must worry about the possibility that Ho is false, and Ha is true. The Type II error is made when the rejection rule indicates that Ho is accepted, when in fact Ho is false and Ha is true. Therefore, the calculation of the probability of making a Type II error depends on the distributional assumptions that come from Ha, and not Ho. In general, there are many ways for Ho to be false, and only one way for Ho to be true, and so calculation of the probability of Type II error is more complicated and more open ended. In general, Ha may hold more than one statistical model, so it can be a collective that hold all possible alternatives to Ho. In general, there are many more ways to fall into error when our assumed model is wrong rather than right, and these errors represent Type II error. Therefore, the Type II error is a slippery slope, because there is no way to nominate a statistical model to the state of statistical purity in advance.

Now here is the interesting observation: the statical model (or theory) is better described as someone`s pet peeve that carries its own emotional attachment. And so the proclivity to fall into Type II error is partly emotional, and as such the tendency to fall into error cannot be quantified by just probability. The scientist loves to calculate the probability of Type I error (i.e., fashion his rejection rule that may be self-serving), but the chore to calculate the probability of Type II error may meet resistence. And the calibration of fit that happily protects against the Type I error (by building the rejection rule), need not be quantitative. The happy calibration may be qualitative, and give itself over to hand waving. Only when the topic turns to Type II error is the happiness replaced by possible anxiety. In worst case, flipping a coin on the side may become the rejection rule with the sought probability of Type I error, but this exercise may be unrelated to the merits of Ho.

What better example of the emotional attachment to theory than that provided by Darwinian belief in evolution by natural selection? The afflicted are good about fitting the fossil record to their pet peeve. The Type I error of rejecting the theory, when it is assumed true, is almost always evaluated given rationalization that show the effectiveness of a hypothetical commutative selection in its navigation of the fitness landscape, ending in adapted life in all its complex forms. But nowhere is the Type II error of accepting the Darwinian model, when it is false, evaluated with such zeal. Only away from the reach of scientism, with those eager to study intelligent design, is the possibility considered.

The tendency to look at Type I error, and only Type I error, becomes one sided ideology as it departs further from the considerations of statistical hypothesis testing. Statistics always had room to consider Type II error, but scientism has no room. In the extreme case, scientism is reduced to flipping a coin on the side, and not looking critically at the fit to real offerings of evidence.